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DETERMINATION OF CHILD CUSTODY: “SHARED
CUSTODY V. JOINT CUSTODY” REFLECTED IN
BROUSSARD V. ROGERS
Aster Lee ∗
When a couple with children divorces, child custody and
support become significant. If the couple does not reach consensus
on those issues, they must bring them to a trial court to determine.
The recent case of Broussard v. Rogers 1 illustrates some of the
difficulties that arise in making awards for child support. This case
note will explore the standards considered by Louisiana trial courts
when determining whether custody is “shared” or “joint”—a
threshold question for the calculation of the amount of child
support owed. This determination, it will be shown, properly
focuses on the percentage of time spent by the children with each
of their divorced parents.
I. BACKGROUND
Ms. Broussard and Mr. Rogers married in 1997 and had
their first child in 2000. 2 In 2003, Ms. Broussard and Mr. Rogers
entered into a joint custody agreement (“Agreement”) and were
divorced thereafter. 3 The contents of the Agreement were as
follows: 1) The parties shared legal joint custody with alternating
one week periods; 2) The agreement did not designate either party
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1. Broussard v. Rogers, 54 So. 3d 826 (La. Ct. App. 5 Cir. 2011).
2. Id. at 828.
3. Id.
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as a custodial parent; and 3) The agreement did not mention
anything about the issue of child support. 4
Approximately five and half years after the divorce, Ms.
Broussard filed a Rule to Change Custody, requesting that the
court change the custody status of her child because the previous
agreement was no longer workable. 5 Specifically, she requested
that the court designate her as a custodial parent. 6 Ms. Broussard
also filed a Rule to Establish Child Support, requesting that the
court award support based on her status as the custodial parent. 7
The trial court granted both motions.8 With respect to custody, the
court allowed Mr. Rogers visitation every other weekend from the
end of the school day on Friday until 6 p.m. on Sunday, plus every
Tuesday and Thursday from the school day’s end until 8 p.m., plus
two unnamed days per week with overnight visitation. 9 Child
support was awarded in the amount of $225.00 per month based
upon the court’s determination that custody was “shared” under the
meaning of Louisiana Revised Statutes [hereinafter L.R.S.] section
9:315.9 and its application of the corresponding calculation
schedule. Ms. Broussard appealed this decision, alleging that the
trial court erred in calculating child support based on the argument
that the trial court used the wrong schedule.
II. DECISION OF THE COURT
The Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal in Broussard
focused on the issue of whether the custody of the child was shared
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. This visitation schedule is reflected in the court’s interim judgment. Id.
An interim judgment, or interlocutory judgment, is an intermediate judgment
that determines a preliminary or subordinate point or plea but does not make a
final determination in the case. A final judgment is a court's last action, which
settles the rights of the parties and disposes of all issues in controversy, except
for the award of costs (and, sometimes, attorney's fees) and enforcement of the
judgment. Judgment, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
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custody under the meaning of L.R.S. 9:315.9 or joint custody
under L.R.S. 9:315.8. 10 The Louisiana Revised Statutes provide
differing methods for the calculation of child support depending
upon whether custody is “joint” or “shared” as defined by law.
According to L.R.S. 9:315.9, when custody is “shared,” each
parent has physical custody of the child for an approximately equal
amount of time. 11 In cases of shared custody, Schedule B is utilized
to calculate support. 12 For all other “joint” custody arrangements in
which custody is not “shared,” support is determined according to
Schedule A. However, there is no statutory guideline to determine
the issue of “an approximately equal amount of time.” 13 Louisiana
Revised Statute 9:315.9 does not bind the trial court to a threshold
percentage determined solely on the number of days spent with the
child. 14 Instead, the trial court has discretion in determining
whether a particular arrangement constitutes “shared custody,”
justifying the application of L.R.S. 9:315.9. 15
The trial court in Broussard held that the custody
agreement between Ms. Broussard and Mr. Rogers, which
provided Mr. Rogers every other weekend and 2 days a week
visitation, constituted “shared custody.” 16 On appeal, Ms.
Broussard argued that the trial court erred on this point based on
the calculation that Mr. Rogers had custody for only 42.85% of the

10. Broussard, 54 So. 3d at 829. At first glance, the issue seems to be
related to the child support issue rather than child custody (Ms. Broussard
alleged that the trial court used the wrong schedule because the trial court used
Schedule B (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:315.9 (2012)) instead of Schedule A (LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:315.8 (2004)). However, the real issue is the type of child
custody, because the court’s determination of which schedule to use ultimately
depends on the determination of which type of child custody the court
recognizes. (e.g., the court shall utilize Schedule A when the type of the child
custody is shared custody under L.R.S. 9:315.8.).
11. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:315.9 (2012) (emphasis added).
12. Id.
13. Broussard, 54 So. 3d at 829.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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time, arguing that the Friday and Sunday visitations constituted
one-half day each. 17
The Court acknowledged that there is no definition of a “day”
for the purposes of custody in L.R.S. 9:315.8 and L.R.S. 9:315.9,
but noted that L.R.S. 9:315.8(E)(2) provides that the court may
determine what constitutes a day for the purposes of support, as
long as it consists at least 4 hours. 18 Although there is no statutory
basis to allow a court to use L.R.S. 9:315.8(E)(2) in determining
the meaning of a “day” for the purposes of support, the majority of
the Court found that there is no provision to prohibit it, either. 19
Thus, based on its review of the trial court’s custody decree,
the Court did not find any abuse of discretion in the trial court’s
finding of shared custody. 20 As long as the trial court’s ruling on
the determination of shared custody was correct, the hearing
officer’s use of Schedule B to calculate the child support was
appropriate.
III. COMMENTARY
The Court’s decision in Broussard can only be evaluated in
light of the history of Louisiana’s statutory scheme for child
support. Prior to the 1989 enactment of uniform guidelines for
determining child support awards, Louisiana, like many other
states, conferred wide judicial discretion to a trial court to
determine support on a case-by-case basis. 21 In order to curtail
potential divergent results among states and within a state due to
the provided judicial discretion, Congress aimed at creating more
uniform child support awards. 22 As a result of this effort, Congress
17. Id. at 829-830.
18. However, the trial court did not state that it used L.R.S. 9:315.8(E)(2)
in determining the custody. Id. at 830.
19. Id. at 830. (Note, however, that in the dissent, Judge Rothschild pointed
out that there is no provision to allow the trial court to use 9:315.8(E)(2) to
determine what constitutes a day for the purposes of custody. Id. at 832.)
20. Id. at 830.
21. Guillot v. Munn, 756 So. 2d 290, 294 (La. 2000).
22. Id. at 295.
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enacted the Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, which
required states to establish numeric guidelines to determine
appropriate amounts of child support. 23 However, the federal
legislation did not require that the state guidelines be binding, and
thus did not operate as a powerful enforcement mechanism for the
state judiciary. 24 Subsequently, Congress enacted the Family
Support Act of 1988, mandating that states establish presumptive
guidelines no later than October 13, 1989. 25 In response to 1988
legislation, the Louisiana legislature adopted presumptive
guidelines to establish or modify child support. 26 The purposes of
the Louisiana’s guidelines were: (i) to address the inconsistency in
the amounts of child support awards; and (ii) to solve the problem
of inadequate amounts of child support awards. 27
Since the federal law mandated that the guidelines be
presumptive, the presumption is rebuttable when the court finds the
application of the guidelines to the circumstances unjust or
inappropriate. 28 The Louisiana Supreme Court in Guillot explicitly
provides a three-prong test for Louisiana trial courts if they are to
deviate from the uniform guideline. 29 First, the trial court must
determine whether the visitation by the non-domiciliary parent is
in fact extraordinary. 30 If a non-domiciliary father visits merely a

23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. 2001 La. Acts No. 1082, §1.
27. The underlying public policy as a foundation for the guidelines was the
best interest of the child. But more specifically, Louisiana’s guidelines use an
“income shares model” to determine and calculate the appropriate amount of
child support. The “income shares model” is founded upon the tenet that the
children should receive the same level of parental income that would have been
provided to them as if their parents had lived together with them. Thus this
approach focuses on the contribution by each parent in proportion to his or her
resources. In other words, Louisiana has established its standard to determine
the appropriate amount of support: the parent obligation to support their children
is conjoint upon the economic capability of the parent. Stogner v. Stogner, 739
So. 2d 762, 766 (La. 1999).
28. Guillot v. Munn, 756 So. 2d at 296.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 299.
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few days more than typical visitation under the guideline, it will
usually not be considered extraordinary visitation warranting
deviation. 31 Second, the trial court must consider whether the extra
time spent with the non-domiciliary parent causes him or her to
bear a greater financial burden and consequently causes the
domiciliary parent to bear a lesser financial burden. 32 This
consideration closely conforms to the Louisiana legislature’s intent
in enacting L.R.S. 9:315.8. 33 Last, it seems that the Louisiana
Supreme Court wanted to provide a safe harbor by setting up
minimum requirements for the trial court’s discretion. 34 It requires
the trial court to determine that the application of the guidelines in
the particular circumstances under consideration would not be in
the best interest of the child or would be inequitable to the parties,
thus emphasizing fundamental policy and equity in child custody
and support. 35 The Louisiana Supreme Court in Guillot did not
intend to draw a bright line as to what constitutes mathematical
formula in determining shared custody, but it still warned the trial
court to deviate “only to the extent not assumed in the statute.” 36
Subsequent to Guillot, the Louisiana legislature codified the
requirements of Guillot in cases where physical custody of a nondomiciliary parent reaches extraordinary levels; in other words, in
cases of shared custody. 37 The newly-enacted L.R.S. 9:315.9
established the threshold percentage for shared custody at 49% for
cases where the “approximately same amount of time” was spent
with the non-domiciliary parent. 38
However, even when the children live with one parent for less
than 49% of their time, the status of shared custody is not
automatically denied. The Louisiana Supreme Court in Guillot
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 301.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:315.8 (2001).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:315.9, cmt.(a) (2012).
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provided a long explanation about the circumstances in which the
trial court may deviate from the amount of child support provided
for by the guidelines. The Louisiana Supreme Court presumed that
the intention of the legislative branch in enacting child custody and
support laws was to achieve a consistent body of law. 39 In most
cases, it is in the child’s best interest to have regular contact with
both parents and to split the custody equally between the parents. 40
Accordingly, the Louisiana Supreme Court distinguished joint
custody and shared custody: in a joint custody scheme, a
domiciliary parent shares most of the time with the children, but he
or she should allow a typical amount of visitation based on the
guidelines conferred by statutes; and in a shared custody scheme,
the non-domiciliary parent spends a non-typical, or extraordinary,
amount of time with the children so that the amount reaches the
heightened level required by statute. On this point—of determining
whether the non-domiciliary parent spends as much time as the
domiciliary parent with the child—the trial court is offered ample
discretion to deviate from the guideline’s threshold percentage.
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Guillot confirmed this wide
discretion allowed to the trial court in such circumstances as
consistent with legislative intent. 41
Since Guillot and the promulgation of L.R.S. 9:315.9, courts
have wrestled with the threshold percentage and its exceptions, as
applied for characterizing custody as shared or joint. 42 For
example, in Lea v. Sanders, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of
Appeals found that L.R.S. 9.319.9 requires 50%–50% (same) or
49%–51% (approximately same) as the “threshold” percentage for
shared custody. 43 The Lea court held that 43% was insufficient to
39. Guillot v. Mund, 756 So. 2d at 298.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 300.
42. Robert C. Lowe. Steps for calculating total support obligation—Shared
custody arrangement and child support under 2001, 2002, and 2003 legislation,
in 1 LA. PRAC. DIVORCE § 8:47 (West 2012 ed.)
43. Id. (citing Lea v. Sanders, 890 So. 2d 764 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2004)).
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establish shared custody. 44 However, in the year following the Lea
decision, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that a
45.5%–54.5% sharing was sufficient to trigger Schedule B, which
was to be utilized for a shared custody situation. 45 There has not
been a Supreme Court case after Guillot on this issue. In Janney,
the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeals held that 45.3% of the
year was sufficient for shared custody, and this is the lowest
percentile for the recognition of shared custody before
Broussard. 46
In Broussard vs. Rogers, Ms. Broussard calculated that Mr.
Rogers had custody for 42.85% of the time. 47 This percentile was
far higher than the 37% which the Louisiana Supreme Court in
Guillot declined to categorize as shared custody, but still lower
than any Louisiana case acknowledging shared custody status.
Broussard v. Rogers thus expands the limitations of the shared
custody designation beyond the existing jurisprudence.
The majority’s justification for this rests on a calculation of
days spent by the child with Mr. Rogers based on L.R.S.
9:315.8(E)(2), which states that a day consists of at least 4 hours
for the purposes of support. As the dissent pointed out, there is no
legal support for the use of such a calculation—which was
supposed to be utilized in determining child support—to be used in
order to determine child custody. 48 The dissenting opinion in
Broussard has some legal merits since there is no statutory basis
for the trial court in Broussard to find that a “day” consists of 4 or
more hours for the purposes of custody. However, the majority’s
position, in a practical sense, provides a uniform measurement for
the counting of a “day” for both child custody and child support. If
44.
45.
2005)).
46.
2005)).
47.
48.

Id.
Id. (citing DeSoto v. DeSoto, 893 So. 2d 175 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir.
Id. (citing Janney v. Janney, 943 So. 2d 396 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir.
54 So. 3d at 830-31.
Id. at 832.
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there are two different methods of counting a “day” for custody
and support, there would be less legal consistency between them
and it might lead to a myriad of redundant arguments by attorneys
who attempt to count a “day” in the manner most advantageous to
their clients. In addition, the legislative intent is to provide wide
discretion to trial courts, so long as this does not severely erode the
uniformity of the guidelines conferred by the statutes. Generally,
the trial court is the best place to balance several pertinent factors
in determining whether, and how much, to deviate from the
guidelines, especially on the issue of measuring the time spent by
each parent with the child. As a result, this case is a good example
to show that a case-by-case approach provides better flexibility for
courts to find the most appropriate ways to achieve the best interest
of the child.

